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ABSTRACT 
This is an attempt to formulate a conditional model of coalition formation. Predictions from this model are 
tested against data on coalition formation in Dutch local government in 1982. Starting from a simple 
model of the behaviour of party politicians, it is assumed that the coalition behaviour of partiesdependson 
the competitiveness of the (local) political system. The choice of a coalition strategy (minimizing size, 
minimizing policy range or proportional representation) is contingent upon two dimensions of the 
competitiveness of local politics. These are the amount of electoral volatility and the extent to which local 
election results follow national trends. Our conditional theory predicts different coalition behaviour in 
polities differing with regard to these two factors. Though the hypothesis was falsified, a more detailed 
analysis showed that (local) political competitiveness did make a difference in the choice of at least some 
of the coalition strategies. These differences, moreover, were in line with what was to be expected from 
the theoretical model. 
In the literature on formal theories of coalition formation, a number of distinct 
theories has been formulated. These theories are normally grouped in two ‘families’, 
differing with regard to the strategy adopted by parties forming coalitions. First, 
there are theories assuming that parties employ a size criterion in their choice from 
alternatives. According to these theories only coalitions of a minimal size will be 
formed. ’ Secondly, there are theories which assume that parties strive for a mini- 
mization of the ideological or policy range of a coalition.’ 
But to state these distinct (groups of) coalition theories, is to begseveralquestions. 
Why should a party opt for one criterion rather than another? Is there one universal 
coalition theory which is valid in all party-political contexts, or are coalition theories 
in some sense conditional? These questions become even more pressing in the light 
of the empirical evidence gathered in such eminent studies as De Swaan (1973) and 
Laver and Taylor (1973). Their tests of coalition theories show that the predictive 
value of theories varies strongly from one country to another. 
*The author thanks Harry Daemen, Einte Elsinga. Nico Mol, Jacques Thomassen and three anonymous 
referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
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This again raises several questions. What makes one country different from 
another? Which characteristics of these countries induce parties to behave in a 
different way? In this article we will propose and test a conditional model of coalition 
formation in which it is assumed that the coalition behaviour of politicans depends on 
relevant conditions of their party-political environment. What are to be considered 
relevant conditions will be decided on the basis of a simple model of party 
competition. 
1. A MODEL OF PARTY COMPETITION 
The central assumption in our simple model of party competition is borrowed from 
Breton (1  974) and Frey and Lau (196%). They assume that politicians try to maximize 
such values as the income, power, prestige and related benefits which come from 
political office. In doing so, politicians are confronted by a number of constraints. 
One of these, according to these authors, is an electoral constraint. Under certain 
circumstances politicians have to compete for the electorate’s favours in order to 
attain or retain office. In the theory of public choice it is generally assumed that the 
competition for electoral support takes the form of offering a policy-mix maximizing 
the party’s share of the vote. As Downs (1957,105-9) pointed out, parties have to be 
consistent and reliable, to a certain extent, with regard to their election-time 
promises. if they wish to be electorally successful in the future. This need for 
consistency and reliability will vary with the degree to which an electoral constraint is 
operative. In other circumstances, however, the electoral constraint is less 
restrictive, and politicians can, without seriously damaging their election result, 
behave in a way that is directly conducive to their ultimate goals. 
An electoral constraint is operative only as long as parties believe that their 
behaviour actually affects results at the poll. As it is our aim to test the hypotheses to 
be formulated against empirical evidence on local government coalition formation, 
we shall concentrate on the local level. In our view there are at least two reasons 
which might induce local politicians to consider the outcome of the election as an 
event they cannot influence. 
First, voters may have developed rather stable voting habits. This is reflected in a 
low rate of political volatility. Political volatility refers to the variations over time of 
the party’s share of the total vote. ’This concept of volatility can be considered as one 
aspect of electoral competition. Constancy of voting shares over a longer period of 
time, reflecting rather stable party affiliations, may induce politicians to believe that 
their behaviour does not affect the outcome of the election. 
Second, in the literature on local elections, the idea that local factors have only a 
marginal impact at the polls, and that the outcome is largely attributable to national 
trends, is widespread (see for instance Dunleavy, 1980, 136-7). The extent towhich a 
local election is ‘nationalized’ can be considered as a second factor determining the 
presence of an electoral constraint on  party behaviour.‘ 
Dichotomizing and cross-classifying electoral volatility and the ‘nationalization’ of 
local elections,5 provides us with four local political system types (Fig. I ) .  
We will refer to electoral systems having a low rate of volatility as low-volatility (as 
against high-volatility) electoral systems. Systems having a high degree of 
nationalization will be labelled ‘nationalized’ as opposed to ‘localized’ systems. 
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Fig. 1. A typology of local electoral systems 
In the next two sections we will argue that the choice of coalition strategy by parties 
depends on the nationalization and volatility of electoral systems. On the basis of our 
simple theoretical model we will hypothesize that size-principle theories are likely to 
predict better in nationalized high-volatility electoral systems while policy-range 
theories perform better in localized high-volatility systems. Furthermore, it will be 
argued that neither size-principle nor policy-range theory is likely to predict coalition 
behaviour accurately in low-volatility electoral systems. We shall also develop a 
coalition theory which is able to account for coalition behaviour under these 
circumstances. 
2. SIZE-PRINCIPLE AND POLICY-RANGE THEORIES6 
Notwithstanding several important differences, size-principle and policy-range 
theories have at least one thing in common. Both are based on the assumption that 
coalition formation is a unique event. This assumption is neither self-evident nor 
inconsequential. Government formation typically is a recurrent event. And the 
behaviour of actors in a sequence of games (a so-called supergame)' can differ 
radically from that of players in a single game (Taylor, 1976). In asequence of games, 
rational actors will adopt strategies maximizing their pay-offs in the supergame, 
rather than in each consecutive game separately. In this context it may be rational to 
forgo short-term benefits to incur larger future benefits. For instance, while it may be 
profitable to  exclude one or more major parties from the coalition in the short run, 
this strategy may be counterproductive in the long run when other parties retaliate by 
excluding you from all future coalitions. 
Whether actors opt for such a long-term strategy depends, among other things,'on 
the turbulence of the environment. A major source of turbulence in the party- 
political environment in which coalition games are played is electoral volatility. The 
electoral strength of a party is likely to be a major determinant in the distribution of 
pay-offs in coalition games (De Swaan, 1973, 155). So high volatility makes future 
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benefits highly uncertain. The rational reaction to this uncertainty is to discount 
future benefits or to disregard these altogether. Therefore high volatility increases 
the inclination of parties to pursue short-term strategies. 
Therefore. even though coalition formation is best conceived of as a supergame, 
under highly uncertain conditions parties will act ‘as if‘ they were playing a single 
game. Under these specific circumstances (high uncertainty, for example high 
volatility), size-principle and policy-range theories can provide accurate predictions. 
For this reason we hypothesize that in high-volatility electoral systems size-principle 
and policy-range theories will predict coalition behaviour more accurately than in 
low-volatility electoral systems. 
Are size-principle coalitions likely in all high-volatility electoral systems, or are 
they more likely to occur in either nationalized high-volatility or localized high- 
volatility systems? Coalition theories based on the size principle assume that the 
stake of the game is the number of seats. This is a ‘fixed prize’: seats for one party 
reduce the number of seats available for the other parties.’ Assuming that the sole 
objective of parties is the maximization of seats in government, as is done in 
size-principle theories, a coalition of minimum size will be formed. 
When will parties make the maximization of seats their sole objective? In our 
theoretical model politicians are motivated by a desire to maximize the rewards of 
political office. Seats in government are likely to be highly attractive in this respect. If 
no electoral constraint is operative, politicians can ignore policy considerations and 
will concentrate on their ultimate goal. In nationalized high-volatility systems, one 
condition for the presence of an electoral constraint is not fulfilled. Though volatility 
is relatively high, fluctuations appear to be largely attributable to national political 
factors. Therefore, in these systems parties are likely to concentrate on the 
maximization of seats. Size-principle theories probably will predict coalition 
formation accurately in this specific context. 
In localized high-volatility elections. however, the conditions for the presence of 
an electoral constraint are fulfilled. Under these conditions parties will try to 
influence the direction of local voting shifts in their favour by competing for electoral 
support. Earlier, we argued that under these circumstances the need for consistency 
and reliability is high. This need will affect the willingness of parties to enter 
particular coalitions. 
Under these circumstances coalitions of parties proposing rather similar policies 
are more likely to form than alliances between parties proposing radically different 
policies. In coalitions of a minimal or limited policy range it is relatively (as compared 
with more heterogeneous alliances) easy to implement policies akin to those 
proposed by all of its members. These coalitions are likely to minimize the damage 
post-election compromising is bound to inflict upon the credibility of coalition 
parties. For this reason it seems warranted to expect that policy considerations 
dominate the process of coalition formation in localized high-volatility systems: 
parties will prefer coalitions with partners having relatively homogeneous policy 
preferences to more heterogeneous coalitions. 
The idea of minimizing the ideological heterogeneity of a coalition, operation- 
alized in the minimization of the coalitions’ ideological or policy range, is at the core 
of policy-range rheory. Therefore we hypothesize that this theory is likely to predict 
coalition behaviour particularly accurately in localized high-volatility electoral 
systems. 
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3. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION THEORY 
As we hypothesized in the previous section both policy-range and size-principle 
theory are likely to be particularly appropriate in high-volatility electoral systems. 
What coalitions will form under more stable conditions? 
First, it should be noted that a stable environment (i.e., low-volatility rates) 
increases the likelihood that politicians will calculate the costs and benefits of 
alternative coalition strategies over a longer period. The outcome of such a 
calculation might show that in the long run a long-term strategy, based on co- 
operation between, rather than on the exclusion of, major parties is profitable. In 
systems having a lower rate of volatility, coalitions, containing either unnecessary 
parties or parties adding to the coalition’s policy range, may be formed. But this 
raises the question what benefits come from grand coalitions. 
Arend Lijphart (1977,27) has argued that excluding major parties from coalitions 
may be unwise in countries lacking a homogeneous and pragmatic political culture. 
Prudent political leaders motivated by a desire for the stabilization of the political 
system in these countries will tend to form grand coalitions. 
The desire to stabilize a country, however, is a motive that does not fit very well in 
our  theoretical model in which it was assumed that politicians try to maximize the 
rewards of office. Stabilization of the political system may be an honourable goal to 
pursue. But behaviour having this effect/function fits in our model only in as far as it 
can be shown to be individually rational for politicians, given the goal of 
maximization of the rewards of office. 
Are there any individual benefits for politicians associated with the formation of 
grand coalitions? We think there are! A long-term agreement in which the division of 
seats in government among the major parties is settled, might be advantageous for 
two reasons. In the first place, the sum of the benefits from such an agreement over 
time might exceed the benefits from short-term strategies based on the exclusion of 
major parties. Secondly, certainty on important future benefits and the 
non-conflictive style of politics associated with grand coalitions are likely to be 
valued in their own right. 
These considerations are clearly related to the rewards of office; no policy con- 
siderations enter. Besides facilitating the computation of long-term costs and 
benefits of alternative strategies, low volatility rates also free politicians from their 
electoral constraint, enabling them to ignore policy considerations and try to 
maximize the rewards of office. Therefore, grand coalitions of one kind or another 
are,  if at all, particularly likely to occur in electoral systems having low volatility 
rates. 
Now the question is, which grand coalition will form? Which parties are ‘major’ 
and will be included in the coalition, and how will government seats be divided 
among the allies? These questions have to be settled once parties agree upon a 
long-term grand coalition, including all major parties. The stability of such an 
agreement is greatly enhanced when the inherently divisive questions of future 
allocation of seats and the inclusion or exclusion of certain parties can be settled in an 
objective way: by applying some simple rules of thumb all parties consider fair 
beforehand. Proportional representation is a principle which provides such 
standards. As Lijphart (1977,39) puts it: ‘Proportionality, as a neutral and impartial 
standard of allocation, removes a large number of potentially divisive problems from 
the decision-making process. ’ 
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This characteristic of the proportionality principle is not  merely a matter of the 
distribution of the payoffs, but touches on essential aspects of coalition formation as 
well. Proportionality adds to the predictability of the political environment and, as 
we noted before, the certainty on future benefits is an important factor determining 
whether or  not to opt for grand coalitions at all. We therefore assume that grand 
coalitions will tend to be formed by applying a rule of proportional representation. “ I  
Finally, we would like to emphasize that, although the idea of a proportional 
representation theory stems from our knowledge of Dutch local government 
coalition behaviour in the past, proportional representation coalitions cannot be 
considered a mere peculiarity of Dutch folklore. After having completed the 
penultimate version of this article, we read Steiner’s account of coalition behaviour 
in Switzerland. From 1959 to 1981 Switzerland has known, what Steiner calls, ‘magic 
formula’ coalitions. The magic formula o n  which these coalitions are based is actually 
nothing else than a rule of proportional representation. What is even more 
interesting is that Steiner’s paper reports an extraordinarily low extent of electoral 
volatility in  Swiss politics (Steiner, 1982,318-9). The Swiss evidence is completely in 
line with the predictions of our theoretical model: a low level of electoral volatility 
induces parties to form grand coalitions based on  a proportional representation rule. 
4. COALITION FORMATION IN DUTCH LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Before we can start testing our hypotheses it is necessary to outline the  institutional 
structure in which coalition formation in Dutch local government takes place. 
Furthermore, we have to make a number of additional assumptions that will enable 
us to apply coalition theory in this setting. 
Formally, Dutch local government is headed by the municipal council. The 
Council of Mayor and Aldermen (which will be abbreviated as CMA from here on) is 
the executive committee. The CMA is presided over by the mayor, who is appointed 
by central government. The aldermen are selected by the municipal council from 
among its members. 
In practice the role of the CMA is much more important than that of the council. 
Students of Dutch local government agree upon the pre-eminence of the CMA over 
the municipal council. Non-representation of a party on the CMA therefore means 
that the party lacks an important base of influence on local policies, and forgoes 
rather prestigious, though not very well-paid, jobs. 
The election of aldermen is preceded by negotiations on the CMA’s composition: 
who is going to support whose candidates for aldermanship at the decisive vote? The 
majority supporting a candidate has to be at least as large as a normal simple majority 
plus one vote. 
In  determining the CMA’s support o n  the council we have to make an additional 
set of assumptions. First. we will assume that only parties represented in the CMA 
supported the council in the decisive vote. Parties not having aldermen in the CMA 
are supposed not to support the council and are not considered to be members of the 
coalition. I ’  
A second additional assumption is needed to enable application of formal coalition 
theories on our data on Dutch local politics. We have to assume that councilmen 
belonging to the same party can be considered as one unitary actor. They share the 
same coalition preferences. This presupposes a certain extent of party discipline. 
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Probably the most heroic additional assumptions in our application of coalition 
theories to Dutch local politics are those with regard to the placement of parties on an 
ideological (policy) continuum. First, we will have to assume that one ideological 
dimension, the socio-economic left-right controversy, will adequately account for 
local party coalition behaviour. Second, we will have to assume (lacking detailed 
local data) that local branches of the national political parties take the same relative 
position on this continuum in every municipality. Third, additional assumptions are 
required to deal with local (independent) parties. 
The plausibility of these assumptions regarding party ideologies is hard to 
evaluate. In as far as evidence on the effect of ideology on coalition behaviour is 
available, it refers to the level of national, not local, political systems (De Swaan, 
1973; Laver and Taylor, 1973). 
Research on the salience of the socio-economic left-right dimension in local 
politics is hard to obtain. Therefore we have to assume that the rank order of local 
branches of national parties equals the rank order of the national parties on the 
socio-economic left-right dimension. In other words, we apply one and the same 
ordering of parties for all municipalities in the Netherlands. No allowance is made for 
local deviations from this ordering. In our analysis we will order parties on a 
left-right continuum as illustrated in Fig. 2. This ordering is borrowed from Lucardie 
(1981).” 
GPV 
PSP RPF 
CPN PPR PVDA D’66 CDA W D  SGP 
left 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 right 
Fig. 2. Ordering of Dutch political parties on a socio-economic left-right scale 
Source Lucardie. 1981. 
Apart from the local branches of national parties, independent parties are 
represented on municipal councils. Their placement on the left-right scale is highly 
problematic. The Dutch Bureau of Statistics distinguishes, among other categories, 
between Roman Catholic-Independent lists, and Independent lists. With regard to 
the Roman Catholic-Independent lists, we will assume that their position on the 
left-right scale is identical to that of the national Christian Democratic party (CDA). 
These lists are concentrated in the southern provinces of the Netherlands where in 
most municipalities the CDA gains an absolute majority in both national and 
provincial elections. In local elections the CDA frequently does not participate, for 
both historic and strategic reasons (for an interesting account of these lists see 
Dittrich, 1978, 115-20). It is difficult to see, assuming a minimal extent of voter 
rationality, how these Catholic-Independent lists could take a policy or ideological 
stance differing radically from the traditional position taken by the CDA. 
With regard to the Independent lists, such a solution is not possible. Therefore we 
removed 53 municipalities, in which an Independent party occupied more than 5 % ”  
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of the council’s seats, from our analysis. This means that about 30% of the 
municipalities with 20,000 inhabitants and over, could not be included in our 
analyses. In the municipalities having less than 20,000 inhabitants the phenomenon 
of Independents and Roman Catholic Independents is virtually ubiquitous. This was 
one motive for our decision not to include these local authorities in our research. “Of 
course, we would have preferred to replace these assumptions with regard to the 
ideological dimension and the party positions thereon with actual assessments. But 
this would require extensive and costly research in about 150 municipalities. 
Resources for such an endeavour were not available. 
5. TESTS OF THEORIES OF COALITION BEHAVIOUR 
We earlier formulated three hypotheses specifying the relevance of different 
coalition theories under different political conditions. These hypotheses, to repeat, 
were: 
( I )  The predictive value of theories based on the size principle is highest in 
(2) The predictive value of theories based on the minimization of ideological 
(3) The predictive value of theories based on proportional representation is 
If these tendencies are to add up to a successful conditional theory of coalition 
behaviour, the combined performance of the best performing size theory in nation- 
alized high-volatility elections of policy-range theory in localized high-volatility 
systems, and of the most adequate variant of proportional representation theory in 
low-volatility electoral systems, should be considerably better than the predictive 
value of traditional coalition theories predicting coalition behaviour irrespective of 
local political conditions. Of course, from the point of view of theoretical parsimony 
these latter theories are preferable. But if the predictive value of our conditional 
model is higher than these more simple unconditional hypotheses one would 
probably prefer this model on these grounds. 
The results of this test, based on a procedure developed by De Swaan 
(1973) and Laver and Taylor (1973), are shown in Table I. The test procedure - 
described in detail in the Appendix - yields a test statistic, V. The larger the V, the 
higher the  predictive value of a theory. 
The first result of our analyses, not reported extensively here, was that none of the 
unconditional theories offered statistically significant test results. This makes a test 
of our conditional theory all the more interesting. Will this model do better than the 
unconditional alternatives and provide statistically significant results? Comparing 
results of our conditional theory with those of the best predicting unconditional 
theory, proportional representation (D’Hondt variant) theory has disappointing 
results. With regard to both the percentage of predictive successes and the test 
statistic V. the unconditional model is clearly superior. So both on grounds of 
predictive adequacy and on grounds of theoretical parsimony, proportional repre- 
sentation theory seems to be a better (though not satisfactory) model for the 
explanation of coalition behaviour in the Netherlands than our conditional model. 
nationalized high-volatility electoral systems. 
distance is highest in localized high-volatility elections. 
highest in low-volatility electoral systems. 
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TABLE 1. Test results of a conditional model of coalition formation compared with the best performing 
simple unconditional theory (data from Dutch municipalities with 20,OOO inhabitants or more in 1982) 
Results conditional theory 
Coalition Value of test 
strategy c/o and number statistic V I  
(predicted to (in and 
be appropriate brackets) of its critical 
in a system predictive value (between 
System type* type)? successes brackets) 
Nationalized Minimum number 21% 11.989 
( N ,  = 24) 
Localized Policy range 40 7c 15.706 
(N,  = 15) 
(N, = 61) representation (35) (133.4) 
Over-all 
conditional (46) (214.5) 
theory 
( E N ,  = 100) 
All Proportional 
(N = 100) representation 56% 169.77 1 
high volatility of parties ( 5 )  (35.8) 
high volatility minimization (6) (55.2) 
Low volatility Proportional 5 7 9  93.530 
D’Hondt variant 
performance of 4670 121.225 
Results of best unconditional theory 
D’Hondt variant (56)  (2 14.5) 
*For the construction of our typology of electoral systems see section 2. 
tFor  a short description of these coalition strategies see footnotes 1 ,2  and 10. 
$For details on the test procedure see the appendix; a = 20%. one-tailed. 
6. CONCLUSION 
N o  doubt several qualifications could and, to be sure, should be made regarding the 
tests of these theories. Some rather demanding operational assumptions had to be 
made. Furthermore, the nature of the test performed here was rather con- 
servative, as compared with the tests conducted by Laver and Taylor (1973) and 
D e  Swaan (1973).15 Maybe in future research some of these assumptions could be 
relaxed and a more lenient test applied. 
Though the tests performed here are no doubt susceptible of improvement, it may 
nevertheless be worth while to have a more detailed look at our results. Should these 
results be completely unintelligible, then the model probably will have to be 
discarded altogether as being essentially a cul-de-sac. 
In our theoretical model a fourfold classification of local political systems was 
proposed. Using the same model, however, a twofold categorization would also have 
been justifiable. We earlier set out a model in which it was assumed that the 
behaviour of politicians (also with regard to coalition formation) was influenced by 
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TABLE 11. Test results of seven unconditional coalition theories in dflerent electoral system-types (data 
from Dutch municipalities with 20,OOO inhabitants or more in 1982) 
System type? 
(in each column: 7~ of predictive successes 
and value of test statistic v,) Z 
Localized high- Nationalized 
Coalition volatility high-volatilit y Low-volatility 
theory* systems systems systems 
Minimum winning 
Minimum weight 
213 criterion 
Minimum number 
of parties 
Minimization of 
policy range 
Proportional 
representation 
D’Hondt variant 
Proportional 
representation 
straight quota  
Number of cases 
Critical value V, 
(a  = 2WX. I-tail) 
17  %i 
9.734 
33% 
10.81 I 
47% 
9.288 
33% 
8.753 
40% 
15.706 
33% 
20.268 
40% 
23.04 1 
IS 
35.8 
2 I %, 
7.018 
4% 
1.386 
21% 
5.787 
21% 
1 1.989 
21% 
13.268 
67% 
55.973 
54%) 
43.424 
24 
55.2 
33% 
23% 
34% 
33% 
26% 
57% 
27.168 
26.42 
25.503 
37.999 
29.619 
93.530 
49% 
83.210 
61 
133.4 
*For a short description of these coalition principles see footnotes 1.2 and 10. 
tFor the construction of our  typology of electoral systems see section 2. 
$For details on test procedure see the appendix. 
the presence/absence of an electoral constraint. Once such a constraint is operative, 
politicians have to compete for the electorate’s vote. From this perspective a twofold 
classification seems natural: systems where an electoral constraint is operative, as in 
localized high-volatility systems, and systems where this is not the case, as in both 
nationalized high-volatility and both types of low-volatility electoral systems. In the 
localized high-volatility systems, politics is likely to be competitive, while in the other 
systems it is probably less or not competitive. 
The data in Table I1 appear to validate this dichotomy of local competitive versus 
other systems. First, it is evident that coalitions of the proportional representation 
type are found relatively more often in nationalized high-volatility and low-volatility 
elections than in localized high-volatility (competitive) electoral systems (hypothesis 
3). Second, most of the theories predicting coalitions based on the exclusion of one or 
more major parties seem to fare better (though not always very much) in localized 
high-volatility than in the other municipalities. This is partially in line with hypo- 
theses 1 and 2. 
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This partial and weak corroboration of our theoretical model poses two problems, 
however. The first question to be asked is: Why is policy-range theory not 
performing better than the minimum-size theories? Here two factors may be at play. 
First there has been, in recent years, a relative convergence of the liberal 
conservative (VVD) and the Christian-Democratic (CDA) parties. Perhaps this 
convergence went so far that for the third major party (the social democrats) a choice 
between either parties became a matter of tweedledee and tweedledum. Second, the 
questionable adequacy of some assumptions (pre-eminence everywhere of socio- 
economic issue dimension and no local deviations from the national ordering of 
parties on that dimension) may have impeded the predictive power of policy-range 
theory . 
The second question to be asked is why minimum-size theory is performing badly 
and proportional representation theory relatively well in nationalized high-volatility 
electoral systems. Apparently, the hypothesized effect of volatility on the willingness 
of parties to adopt long-term strategies does not occur, or is not strong enough to 
affect the coalition behaviour of parties. The size of fluctuations in the voting shares 
of parties in systems characterized as highly volatile does not seem to be as large as to 
let high volatility be an important determinant of uncertainty on the future benefits 
of grand coalitions. With the wisdom of hindsight it might be argued that grand 
coalitions in electorally turbulent environments offer parties some insurance against 
electoral windfalls and other threats to their participation in the governmental 
coalition. 
Our  data suggest that in electoral systems lacking competition, political parties are 
more likely to opt for co-operative strategies, than in systems where politicians are 
forced to compete. This points to a basic parallel between the behaviour of parties in 
the political market and firms in the economic market. In either setting the com- 
petitiveness of a market is closely related to the collusion of entrepreneurs. 
A cautious conclusion can now be formulated. Apparently, coalition behaviour 
varies with the competitiveness of the local political arena. In nationalized high- 
volatility and low-volatility electoral systems where the electoral constraint and the 
urge to  compete are absent, coalition behaviour acquires, relatively often, the 
character of co-operation in a grand coalition (based on proportional rep- 
resentation). Coalition behaviour based on the exclusion of major parties, however, 
is not very frequently found in these settings, while it is found more often in localized 
high-volatility (competitive) electoral systems. 
Though our conditional theory as such proved inadequate in its predictions, a 
more detailed look at our data showed that some interesting differences in the 
performance of coalition theories occurred under conditions that, according to our 
model, would be relevant for coalition behaviour. These differences, moreover, 
were at  least partially in line with what might have been expected from our model. 
These findings, in our view, suggest that in the development of a more adequate 
and general coalition theory, the notion of a conditional model (different coalition 
strategies apply under different conditions) may play an important role. Further- 
more, our findings indicate that in future theoretical and empirical work on coalition 
behaviour it may be worth while to pay attention to the competitiveness of party 
politics as a relevant condition. 
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NOTES 
1 For a detailed review of formal coalition theories see De Swaan (1973). Coalition theories dealt with 
here all assume that only coalitions commanding at least a majority (winningcoalitions) of seats in the 
legislative council will be formed. Size-principle theories predict coalitions of minimum size. Size 
theories differ in definitions of size. Minimum winning theory predicts that no coalitions containing 
unnecessary actors will be formed. A party is considered unnecessary if it can be excluded from the 
coalition without making that coalition nonwinning. Another variant of size theory predicts that only 
coalitions o f  a minimum number ofpurties will be formed. In minimum weight theory the formation of 
coalitions commanding a minimum number (though still a majority) of seats in the legislative council is 
predicted. A variant on  minimum weight theory, the two-thirds-criterion proposirion, predicts, 
allowing for effects o f  uncertainty. only coalitions o f  relatively modest (commanding up to 67% of the 
seats) majorities. These four theories will be tested later. 
2 These theories assume that parties can be ordered on an ideological continuum. The coalition havinga 
minimum range (between the leftmost and riphtmost party in the coalition) on that continuum will be 
formed. For details on the concept of range and the comparison of ranges. see De Swaan. 1Y73.92. In 
our tests of these theories. we followed this author in these matters. In our tests of policy-range theory 
we tested one variant only. one allowing f o r  both minimum-range coalitions containing unnecessary 
parties and coalitions without such parties. 
3 Another dimension of political competition is political concentration. This multidimensional view 
upon competition is also found in economic literature: see for instance Stigler. 1983. 34. The term 
'volatility' is borrowed from Pedersen (1983). Our  index isclosely related to the indicator proposed by 
Pedersen. The degree of electoral volatility is defined as the average of the absolute inter-election 
differences between the voting shares of particular blocs o f  political parties in the 1970, 1974 and 1978 
municipal elections (data on the 1982 elections are not yet available). The formula is 
h 
in which PI. I y  = voting share of party bloc i in 19. . 
For the purpose of  calculating the index wc distinguished six blocs, extreme right (BP, BR. SGP, 
G P V ) ,  liberal (VVD, DS'70). Christian-Democratic (CDA, KVP, ARP, CHU. Roman Catholic 
Independents. PCG. PC and CCP). Centre-left (PvdA, PAK and D'M), extreme left (PPR. PSP and 
CPN).  and Independents. Data on  blocs were used in order to enhance inter-temporal comparisons. 
For obvious reasons our  index reflects on11 net changes in voting shares. For our  purposes this is 
acccptable. since this index in our  model functions as a criterion upon which local politicians base the 
judgment on the presence or absence of an electoral constraint. Most local politicans will not have 
information on  gross Huctuations. 
4 In order to establish the degree of nationalization o f  local election results we computed the national 
average inter-election mutations of the voting shares of the party blocs used earlier in the computation 
of the index of electoral volatility. These averages were computed over all municipalities having 20,000 
inhabitants o r  more. Then our  index of nationalization of elections was computed as: 
6 C Ip1.71,7, - N i , 7 ( L 7 J I  + I P i . 7 , t  7~ - N  i . 7 1 b 7 ~ I  + I P i , 7 ~ 7 ~ - N i , 7 6 7 8 I  
NI  = ' = I  
6 
in which PI 1y = voting share of party bloc i in 19. . 
pi 7 7 = (PI 147 -PI 197 
N ,  l9 = national average voting share of party bloc i in 19. . 
in all municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants 
Ni 7 7 = (Ni I Y 7  - Ni 14- ) 
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This index equals 1 when local election results perfectly mirror national trends. The smaller NI 
becomes, the more important are local deviations from these national averages. 
We considered an EFI score of 4.594 or higher as a high rate of volatility, and a score of 4.5Y3 and 
below as a low or medium rate of volatility. Furthermore an NI score of 1 too.  172 was considered as a 
high degree of nationalization, a score of 0.171 and below, as a medium or low degree of national- 
ization. Thcsc cutting points were chosen to coincide with the variable means (EFI mean: 4.594; NI 
mean: 0.171). 
Coalitions in Dutch local government were traditionally based on a principle of proportional 
representation. In the late 1960s and 1970s a new form of coalition formation gradually became more 
popular. These new coalitions were based on the exclusion of one or more major parties and or 
programmatic negotiations between parties. Research into this new phenomenon wasdone by Wolters 
(1976) and Tops and Korsten (1984). In this article we will see whether these ‘new’ coalitions are of a 
minimum size or of minimal policy range, and under what conditions coalitions excluding major 
parties are likely to occur. 
We are indebted to Nico Mol for his suggestion to include the notion of supergames in thiscontext. Of 
course, the sole responsibility for its application rests with the author. 
Another factor, of course, is the rate of discount on future benefits. Here we will assume that 
politicians use the same discount rate under all circumstances and that it is not so high as to preclude 
long-term strategies. Furthermore, we assume, for the sake of simplicity, that all politicians value a 
specified number of seats in government equally. 
Of course, the number of Cabinet ministers or aldermen may be increased, but this reduces the 
average weight of these positions. 
We actually used two rules of proportional representation. The well-known D’Hondt method and a 
straight quota system using greatest remainders as means of allocating any remaining seats. The 
D’Hondt method tends to yield coalitions of fewer parties than the greatest remainders method. Both 
variants were tested against our data. 
This raises two problems. First, this assumption is completely inadequate in the small municipalities. 
Here there are only two aldermen, and in the fractionalized Dutch party system, it is often impossible 
to compose a CMA supported (in the strict operational sense proposed here) by a majority of the 
council. This is one of the reasons for confining our analysis to municipalities having 20,000 or more 
inhabitants. Making this assumption implies that we ignore the possibility that parties having no 
aldermen in the CMA support it because the mayor is a party member. Empirical evidence in this 
respect is scarce and based only on a survey of mayors from the sociodemocratic party. This survey, 
however, seems to support this assumption (Wolters, 1976.53). Furthermore. parties having less than 
5% of the seats (one in municipalities with less than 70,000 inhabitants and two or less in authorities 
with more than 70,000) were not considered players in the coalition game. They cannot enter coalitions 
or support them. This assumption was made in order to facilitate our computations that had to be 
performed with the help of a desk calculator only. 
Lipschits’s (1969) ordering is identical, apart from minor details due to later developments in Dutch 
politics. Castles and Mair (1984,80) reported essentially the same ordering based on a questionnaire 
survey of nine leading Dutch political scientists. Furthermore it can be noted that in a mass survey Van 
der Eijk and Niemoller (1983, 247-50) find that when electors are asked to order parties along a 
left-right scale they too are constructing this ordering. 
See note 11. 
See note 11, for another reason. 
See appendix for further details. 
APPENDIX: STATISTICAL TEST 
The test of significance used here is closely related to tests employed by De Swaan (1973, appendix by 
Mokken) and Laver and Taylor (1973). In these tests it is assumed that the coalition actually formed is 
randomly selected from the set of coalitions that can be formed in a particular situation. Here we assume, 
following De Swaan and Mokken (1980,203)- that only majority coalitions are to be considered elements 
of the set of all possible coalitions. Using the binomial distribution the probability of a successful 
prediction of theory T assuming randomness, and sampling without replacement, is: 
P = (;) (s)s ( l - y s  
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in which G = number of coalitions formed in situation i = I 
S = the number of successful predictions by theory T (either 0 or I )  
Q = the number of coalitions predicted by theoryT 
C = the number of possible majority coalitions in situation i. 
G = I .  and S is either 0 or I ,  because we considered only the first coalition formed n the 19824 
period. 
Since we want a general evaluation of a theory and no evaluation which is limited toone situation only 
(as in formula 1 ), test results have to be aggregated one way or another. Both Laver and Taylor (1973) and 
De Swaan ( 1973) propose to sum the results of these K independent tests in the following way: 
in which In (pi) is the natural 
logarithm of p,. 
This test statistic V is approximately chi-square distributed with 2k degrees of freedom. Laver and Taylor 
correct this statistic for continuity. Since we are not interested in the exact probabilityof the test results we 
did not use such a correction (De Swaan and Mokken, 1980.205). 
The test performed here is very conservative indeed. First because we did not use the correction for 
continuity (see De Swaan and Mokken. 1980.21 1 ). but also because of the stringency of our actor criterion 
(here: 5 % ;  Laver and Taylor, 1% and De Swaan and Mokken 2.5%). Since thereby we declare anumber 
of parties as ‘non-existent’ in the coalition game. the number of possible coalitions decreases. Inspection 
of equation ( I )  shows that this number is determining P and thereby the test statistic V. Because of the 
conservativeness of this test we employed a rather lenient (a = 20%. one-tailed) parameter. 
Finally, it is important to note that this test procedure is not used in order to generalize any findings (we 
used data from total population). This test is used as a rather arbitrary criterion to evaluate the different 
theories proposed. 
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